BRIEF IX OF X

The Legal Memoranda — The Real Law Behind Each Claim

Adverse Possession · Sedition · Treason · L3Cs

STATUTES AT LARGE · CONTROLLING CASES · THE L3C STRUCTURE

RESEARCH BRIEF · VERBATIM EVIDENCE QUOTES · SHARED CITATION LEDGER

What adverse possession actually requires,
what sedition and treason statutes say,
and what an L3C is and is not.

THE REINVENTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK · MMXXVI
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*Exhibit docs covered (*raw*/):* Squatting or Adverse possession.md *(93 KB, 561 lines) and* DISCLAIMER - Seditious Conspiracy & Treason via L3C formation.md *(52 KB, 287 lines) plus its* VERSION 1 *variant (same topic; diff noted in §1.3). Educational-exhibit context: keep every word, test every claim. Method note: each claim below was checked against primary sources (statutes at uscode.house.gov / NY Senate / Cornell LII; court opinions at Cornell, CourtListener, Justia; AP reporting; NARA). Written 2026-10-13.*

1. CLAIMS / CONTENT MAP

Both documents are "patchwork" texts: long stretches of accurate, Wikipedia-grade reference prose with sovereign-citizen pseudo-law spliced in. The pattern matters for exhibition — the reliable parts give the pseudo-law its camouflage.

1.1 Squatting or Adverse possession.md

Lines (approx.)	Content	Verdict
1–3	*Ignorantia juris non excusat*, agnotology	Accurate reference material; thematically irrelevant to adverse possession
5–15	"Adverse abandonment" (STB / 49 U.S.C. § 10903 / Bankruptcy Code § 1170 rail-line abandonment)	Accurate but off-topic — a real railroad-regulation term placed to make "adverse" do heavy lifting
17–37	Adverse possession / acquisitive prescription / usucaption intro; padded digressions on common law, statutes, sovereign states, polities, cities, legislatures	Core definition accurate (elements, statute-of-limitations structure); the sovereign-state and "legal title cannot be acquired in an extralegal jurisdiction" (l.41) padding is thematic seeding for the sovCit use
39–69	General doctrine, Roman law, Limitation Act 1623, *nullum tempus occurrit regi* (government land immune), Torrens systems	Accurate textbook material
71–103	England & Wales: Limitation Act 1980, LRA 2002 sch. 6, *JA Pye (Oxford) v Graham*, *Best v Chief Land Registrar*	Accurate (UK law is correct as stated)

Lines (approx.)	Content	Verdict
105–151	US disseisor requirements, additional elements, 2008 NY amendment (l.127–133), *Hudson Square Hotel* air-rights holding, quiet title, abutters	Mostly accurate; see §2.1 for the NY specifics it gets right and the Savannah River claim it garbles (l.151 — §3.8)
153–156	Louisiana acquisitive prescription, Civil Code art. 3473/742 structure (10-yr good-faith/just-title; 30-yr without)	Accurate
157–169	"Squatter's rights" defined; tacking/privity; clock resets; England LASPO s.144 vs adverse possession	Accurate — this is the single most relevant passage for the NY squatter controversy (§2.1.4)
171–187	Utilitarian justifications; IP-law extension scholarship	Accurate
189–329	Fiat money (≈40% of the doc): China/jiaozi, New France playing-card money, Bretton Woods, Nixon shock, money creation, inflation debates	Accurate reference material but entirely off-topic; included to frame currency/tax grievances
331–357	"See also" list (Preemption Act of 1841, easement, lien, etc.)	Navigation stub
359–513	Philippine acquisitive/extinctive prescription (Arts. 1106–1155); Roman *usucapio* mechanics; Rabbinic-law usucaption (Bava Bathra 3:1) incl. Ottoman-era *mülk/kharaj* custom	Accurate as comparative-law material; again off-topic to NY

Where it veers: subtly. This doc contains no explicit pseudo-legal demand — its role is to normalize the vocabulary ("possession is nine-tenths of the law," l.359; government-land immunity; "squatter's rights") that the other documents in the workspace (e.g., *NOTICE OF RESTORATION OF LENAPEHOKING*) leverage for land-reclamation claims. The nearest thing to an asserted claim is the worked example that 15 years + 20 years = 35 years to title (l.161) — arithmetically fine, legally misleading in NY (see §3.2), and the fiat-money excursus's framing ("the United States is bankrupt"-adjacent themes live in the DISCLAIMER doc, not here).

1.2 DISCLAIMER - Seditious Conspiracy & Treason via L3C formation.md

Lines (approx.)	Content	Verdict
1–7	Title; headline framing of 18 U.S.C. § 2384 and Art. III § 3	Headline accurate on both statutes (the one genuinely solid legal passage — see §4); framing is a warning-as-ambition: the doc advertises the crimes its own movement risks
9	"The U.S. Secretary of State is the 'Archivist' of legal titles of 'The People', i.e., the 'Beneficiaries' of the Estate Trust … domiciled in Washington, D.C."	Pseudo-law. Classic sovereign-citizen mythology (FBI-listed indicators; §1.4). The actual Archivist of the United States heads NARA (44 U.S.C. § 2102); the Secretary of State has no custodial role over "titles of The People," and no "Estate Trust" exists in law
13	"I: Philomen-Anabelle: McFee© … am a Foreign Sovereign operating within the Territorial United States … owed The Law of Peace, pursuant to Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-1"	Pseudo-law. This is the sovCit "Mandatory Notice" template, nearly verbatim (§1.4). DA Pam 27-161-1 is a real DoD treatise — *International Law, Vol. I: The Law of Peace* (1979) — governing the U.S. military's conduct in foreign affairs/occupied territory. It confers no personal immunities on civilians and has never been so held in any court

Lines (approx.)	Content	Verdict
15	Demand for refund of "malappropriated SALT taxes"; commercial liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 1341, 1342	§ 2333 is the civil remedy for victims of international terrorism; § 1341/1342 concern postal fraud/obstruction — none creates a tax-refund cause of action. SovCit boilerplate (same trio appears in the von Reitz "mandatory notice" templates circulating online)
17, 109, 113–117	"Political status ... procedurally corrected"; notices deposited with USPS "in its capacity as universal receiver"; "in rem admiralty proceedings ... out of New York Harbor's Port Authority"; "UN regional member state courts"; 28 U.S.C. § 1442(d)(3)	Pseudo-law. The admiralty/UN-court theory is a sovereign-citizen staple. § 1442 is the federal-officer removal statute; subsection (d)(3) merely defines "law enforcement officer" for removal purposes and confers no substantive rights or immunities
19–107	NY public-benefit corporations / public authorities: NY Const. art. X § 5, *City of Rye v. MTA*, *Schulz v. State*, PACB, Robert Moses, ABO 2018 stats (47 state / 531 local authorities), eminent domain (Grotius, *Berman*, *Midkiff*, *Kelo*)	Substantially accurate reference material (the best-researched section) — deployed here to build the "I have no contractual obligations to any NY public-benefit corporation" claim (l.21), which is legally meaningless: statutes bind regardless of personal consent
49	"...sue the United States ... which will never provide remedy because the United States is bankrupt"	False — gold-standard sovCit shibboleth; the U.S. pays Court of Federal Claims just-compensation judgments routinely (Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491)

Lines (approx.)	Content	Verdict
51	"In the United States, a 'person' is defined as a 'foreign state' … an 'individual' is defined as an artificial 'federally chartered entity'"	False — inversion of the ordinary meanings; in federal statutes "person" *includes* individuals (e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1), and this specific definition pair appears in no statute
59–61	IRS and national banks "do not have regulatory authority to file liens in the several U.S. States"; IRS non-compliance = "counterfeiting securities"; state law governs prosecution	False — tax-protester boilerplate; 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323 create federal tax liens that are properly filed state-side and enforceable
107–151	"INNER-standing the … dual justice system"; *Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates* as "judge loses jurisdiction" authority; Fed. Res. Act § 16 / 12 U.S.C. § 411 "elastic currency"; "waiver of immunity" string-cite (*Luckenbach v. The Thekla* etc.); "Tax-Exempt No. C40468385"; "repatriated W-2 WARRANT OFFICER, deported U.S. Citizen"; ©-name punctuation	Pseudo-law throughout. *Yates* held only that judicial immunity doesn't cover intentional torts outside judicial function — it does not void orders for alleged legal error. The immunity string-cites are classic non-authority padding. The "tax-exempt organization" tradename for a natural person, the© stylized name, and the "W-2 warrant officer" persona are sovCit indicators (FBI: misuse of copyright-of-name, fictitious financial instruments)

Lines (approx.)	Content	Verdict
149–287	HYBRID L3C explainer: definition, Robert Lang origin, PRI mechanics (Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)), formation, member-managed vs manager-managed, taxation, Vermont 2008 first statute, state list, NC repeal 2014, SEEDR L3C example, pros/cons tables	Substantially accurate (a faithful Wikidata/Wikipedia-grade summary) — with two errors: the claim that Vermont's statute "allowed the L3C legal form to operate in every U.S. state" (false; see §3.6) and "HYBRID L3C Defined: The default United States corporate structure" (l.151 — false; the default business structure is the ordinary LLC; only ~1,700 L3Cs existed nationwide by 2020, by the doc's own figures)

1.3 The VERSION 1 variant (…VERSION 1.md, 50 KB)

Same skeleton; header is plain "DISCLAIMER" (not "ADMINISTRATIVE"); the declarant is "I: Claudia-Teresa: Valencia© for VALENCIA, CLAUDIA TERESA" instead of McFee; it addresses NYC's Corporation Counsel (Steven Banks) with a page of accurate NYC Law Department description; and it lacks the McFee variant's NY public-authority block and L3C explainer, but contains the same Foreign Sovereign / Law of Peace / 18 U.S.C. 2333/1341/1342 template, the same Yates/ Luckenbach pseudo-authorities, and the same "Restoration, Reclamation and Restitution" demands. I.e., it is an earlier, shorter cut of the same form letter — evidence the template circulates with plug-in names.

1.4 SovCit indicator cross-reference (FBI / court findings)

The "Foreign Sovereign" + "Estate Trust beneficiaries" + "Archivist of titles" + "Law of Peace / DA Pam 27-161-1" cluster is documented sovereign-citizen boilerplate:

— FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, *"Sovereign Citizens: A Growing Domestic Threat to Law Enforcement"* (Sept. 2011) — lists "paper terrorism" (fraudulent liens, bogus financial instruments), copyrighting one's name, and fictitious "foreign sovereign" status claims among movement indicators.

— Courts apply these labels to near-identical texts. In *Wildervoorn-Doomes*-type dismissals, e.g. Marcantel v. United States, No. 3:23-cv-00180 (M.D. La. 2023) (magistrate's report), the plaintiff filed "vessels doing business as [Name] … publishing MANDATORY NOTICE that they are Foreign Sovereigns … not subject to Territorial or Municipal United States law and owed The Law of Peace, Department of the Army Pamphlet

27-161-1 ... 18 USC 2333" — sentence-for-sentence the same template as lines 13–15 of the DISCLAIMER doc. The court found the filings "frivolous and without merit," citing the standing rejection of sovereign-citizen theories.

— The Anna von Reitz "Mandatory Notice" templates (annavonreitz.com) circulating in the movement

contain the identical "Foreign Sovereigns ... owed The Law of Peace, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-1, from all Territorial and Municipal Officers and employees who otherwise have no permission to approach or address them ... 18 USC 2333 18 USC 1341 and 1342" language — the source family of the exhibit text.

— Additional markers present in the doc and on FBI lists: punctuation stylings

("Philomen-Anabelle: McFee©"), a fictitious tax-exempt number, "secured party"/estate-trust beneficiary framing, USPS-as-notary/universal-receiver myth, and refusal-of-consent-to-contract ("adhesion contracts") rhetoric.

2. THE RECORD — verified law with citations

2.1 Adverse possession in New York (RPAPL §§ 501–541)

Statutory frame. Article 5 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RPAPL") governs: § 501 (definitions), §§ 511–512 (adverse possession under written instrument/judgment — "color of title"), §§ 521–522 (adverse possession not under written instrument), § 531 (landlord-tenant relation), § 541 (tenants in common), § 543 (boundary-line acts).

The statutory period is 10 years. RPAPL § 501(2) ties title to the statute of limitations in CPLR § 212(a) — an action to recover real property must be commenced within ten years; when it expires (and the occupancy has been adverse, under claim of right, open and notorious, continuous, exclusive, and actual), title vests in the adverse possessor.

Elements. The classic five-element formulation, restated by the Court of Appeals in *Walling v. Przybylo*, 7 N.Y.3d 214 (2006): possession must be (1) hostile and under claim of right, (2) actual, (3) open and notorious, (4) exclusive, and (5) continuous for the statutory period (citing *Belotti v. Bickhardt*, 228 N.Y. 296 (1920); *Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz*, 304 N.Y. 95 (1952)). Proof is by clear and convincing evidence (*Ray v. Beacon Hudson Mountain Corp.*, 88 N.Y.2d 154 (1996)).

****Walling v. Przybylo* and the 2008 amendments.* Walling* held that an adverse possessor's actual knowledge of the true owner does not, by itself, defeat the "claim of right" element — the Wallings won title to a strip they knew (from a 2004 survey) belonged to the Przybylos, based on 18+ years of mowing, landscaping, and construction across the mistaken boundary. The Legislature reacted in 2008 (effective July 8, 2008, L. 2008, ch. 269), amending RPAPL Article 5 to:

— redefine "claim of right" as "a reasonable basis for the belief that the property belongs

to the adverse possessor" (§ 501(3)) — codifying a good-faith-style requirement that overrules *Walling* for claims accruing after the amendment;

— deem "de minimis non-structural encroachments" (fences, hedges, shrubbery, plantings, sheds, non-structural walls) and lawnmowing or similar maintenance across a boundary line "permissive and non-adverse" per se (§ 543(1)–(2));

— tighten §§ 511/512 (written-instrument claims: the instrument must actually describe the land, and possession must be of the whole described premises, with the requirements expressly stated in § 512(1)–(6)).

Retroactivity was limited: the amendments apply to claims filed on or after July 8, 2008, but courts hold title vests under the law in force when the prescriptive period completed, so pre-2008-vesting claims are measured by the old standard (*e.g.*, Fourth Department unconstitutionality-of-retroactive-application analysis; First Department, June 30, 2016, applied the same vesting rule, discussed next).

*******Hudson Square Hotel, LLC v. Stathis Enterprises, LLC*, 2016 NY Slip Op 05232 (1st Dep't, June 30, 2016) — the case summarized (mostly accurately) at lines 129–133 of the squatting doc: title vested when the plaintiff "satisfied the requirement of the statute in effect at the relevant time"; an encroachment on the land suffices — the possessor need not physically occupy the air above — and "[w]ith title to land come air rights*," so the plaintiff acquired the (more valuable) air rights derivatively.* Caveat for accuracy: *later stages of the litigation (*Stang LLC v. Hudson Square Hotel*, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2016) disqualified the plaintiff's counsel and vacated the 2013 conveyance obtained by the adverse-possession winner, so the air-rights dictum should be exhibited as a holding later complicated by attorney-misconduct litigation.

Recent squatter-coverage controversy and the 2024 statutory fix. Through the early 2020s, NYC (especially Queens) and Long Island saw widely covered cases of strangers occupying homes; public furor centered on the (largely mythical) idea that 30 days of occupation converts a squatter into a "tenant" whom police will not remove. In fact, the 30-day figure comes from the definition of *tenant/roommate* status in RPAPL § 711 (possession 30 consecutive days → removable only by court process), while squatters have long been removable under § 713(3) (ten-day notice to quit) — a distinction courts already drew (*Paulino v. Wright*). Media/political pressure produced the FY 2025 budget fix signed by Gov. Hochul on April 20, 2024: RPAPL § 711 was amended to state "A tenant shall not include a squatter," defining a squatter as one "who enters onto or intrudes upon real property without the permission of the person entitled to possession, and continues to occupy the property without title, right or permission," with § 713 controlling in conflicts. Companion bill S8866–S8869 (self-help eviction carve-outs, law-enforcement removal, criminal-trespass clarification) were introduced but not enacted as of writing. Key exhibit point: the 2024 amendment changed eviction procedure only — it did not touch the 10-year RPAPL Article 5 requirements for acquiring title by adverse possession, which remain as amended in 2008.

2.2 Seditious conspiracy — 18 U.S.C. § 2384

Text/elements. "If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." (18 U.S.C. § 2384; enacted 1861, ch. 100; current ch. 115.) Elements per standard jury instructions (*U.S. v. Abdel Rahman*, S.D.N.Y. 1995; D.D.C. 2022 instructions): (1) two or more persons agreed to accomplish one of the statutory objects; (2) the conspiracy was formed or pursued in the U.S. or a place subject to its jurisdiction; (3) the defendant knowingly joined with intent to further the unlawful object. No overt act need be proved (unlike § 372 or ordinary § 371 conspiracies charged with an overt-act requirement), and success is irrelevant — the agreement itself is the crime; force is an ingredient of the object, not of its execution. The statute survives First Amendment challenge because it punishes agreements to use force, not advocacy (*United States v. Rahman*, 189 F.3d 88, 124–32 (2d Cir. 1999), applying *Brandenburg v. Ohio*); "oppose by force" requires force against the government's authority, not mere opposition to particular officials (*U.S. v. Rodriguez*, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1986) — Treason Clause does not limit § 2384).

Modern applications.

— ***United States v. Rhodes* (Oath Keepers), D.D.C. No. 22-cr-15 (APM).** Nov. 29, 2022: founder

Stewart Rhodes and Florida chapter leader Kelly Meggs — first seditious-conspiracy convictions in decades — plus Harrelson, Watkins, and Caldwell at a second trial; jury special verdict found the objects "to oppose by force the authority of the Government of the United States" and "to use force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law." Rhodes sentenced to 18 years (Sept. 2023) with a domestic-terrorism enhancement; sentences later partially reduced before the 2025 commutations.

— ***United States v. Tarrio* (Proud Boys), D.D.C. No. 21-cr-175 (TJK).** May 4, 2023: Enrique

Tarrio, Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs, and Zachary Rehl convicted of seditious conspiracy (Pezzola acquitted of sedition, convicted of other felonies) — the third J6 sedition trial; charges survived dismissal motions (*U.S. v. Nordean*, 602 F. Supp. 3d 24 (D.D.C. 2022): the "authority" and "execution" clauses cover conspiracies to obstruct the Twelfth Amendment/Electoral Count Act count wholesale, which is effectively their only application).

— ***Whitmer-kidnapping plot* (2020).** Charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (kidnapping conspiracy)

and § 2332a (WMD) — not § 2384, a point exhibits often get wrong. Ty Garbin and Kaleb Franks pleaded guilty; Daniel Harris and Brandon Caserta were acquitted (Apr. 8, 2022); Adam Fox and Barry Croft hung at trial one, were convicted at retrial (Aug. 23, 2022; Fox 16 yrs, Croft 19⅔ yrs, affirmed 6th Cir. 2025); separate Michigan state convictions (Bellar, Morrison, Musico) were later overturned on appeal (2026). The plot shows the seditious-agreement pattern without a § 2384 charge.

— History/rarity. Enacted 1861; used against Confederate irregulars and the 1943 *Haupt*

Nazi-sabotage-era prosecutions; ~1950s *Lebron/Rahman* prosecutions; then decades of disuse until January 6 — roughly a dozen federal defendants total convicted of § 2384 since WWII before the 2022 verdicts. The AP's characterization ("rarely used Civil War-era charge") is the consensus.

2.3 Treason — U.S. Const. art. III, § 3

Text. "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."

Verified doctrine.

— The Constitution limits treason; Congress cannot expand it (*Cramer v. United States*, 325

U.S. 1 (1945) — "the treason paradigm was written to exclude 'constructive' treasons"); conviction requires proof of the defendant's own overt act.

— *Levying war. Ex parte Bollman*, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.): assembling

with intent to overthrow by force can levy war; mere conspiracy to levy war cannot — hence the separate statutory crime of seditious conspiracy (§ 2384) to fill the gap.

— *Aid and comfort* requires an declared enemy (war or legally recognized enemy) and

overt acts; *Cramer* and *Kawakita v. United States*, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) mark the outer limits.

— Rarity. Federal treason prosecutions are vanishingly rare — the Supreme Court has decided

only six treason cases in U.S. history; the last federal conviction was Tokyo Rose / Iva Toguri D'Aquino (1949) (pardoned 1977); *Kawakita* (1952) was the last Supreme Court treason case. Modern domestic-extremist violence is prosecuted under § 2384, material-support (18 U.S.C. § 2339A/B), and murder/terrorism statutes — never Art. III treason, because of the two-witness rule and the "war" requirement.

— Penalty. Congress set the punishment by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2381: death, or imprisonment

not less than five years and a fine of at least $10,000, plus incapacity to hold office — the exhibit doc's "Death or minimum 5 years" matches § 2381, and its "only crime defined in the Constitution" line is correct.

2.4 L3C — the low-profit limited liability company (nothing exotic)

— What it is: an ordinary LLC whose articles must state that its significant purpose is one

or more charitable or educational purposes, that no other purpose (income/appreciation) is a significant purpose, and that it is not formed for political or legislative purposes — tracking Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) (the private-foundation program-related investment (PRI) test, stemming from the Tax Reform Act of 1969's 5%

payout regime). Members keep LLC limited liability; the entity is taxed like any LLC (pass-through by default; C- or S-election available); it is not tax-exempt.

— Origin: conceived by Robert M. Lang, Jr. (Mary Elizabeth & Gordon B. Lang Foundation,

NY) with the Americans for Community Co-operation; first statute Vermont, April/May 2008 (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, §§ 3001(2)(C), 3312), followed by Michigan (2008), Wyoming, Utah, Illinois (2009), North Carolina (2010), Louisiana, Maine, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Missouri, and the Crow Tribe of Montana and Oglala Sioux Tribe (tribal codes); Puerto Rico also enacted. North Carolina repealed retroactively effective Jan. 1, 2014. Adoption peaked around a dozen-plus jurisdictions; the doc's state list matches this record.

— The IRS has never certified the form. The IRS declined to issue blanket guidance that every

L3C automatically qualifies as a PRI recipient; any particular investment is tested case-by-case, and foundations commonly seek a costly private letter ruling (often cited at $25–50k+ and 12–18 months). This uncertainty — plus profit-motivated investors' resistance to the "no significant profit purpose" cap — is why the form never scaled (≈711 L3Cs in 2013; ≈ 1,700 by 2020, per the doc's own figures, citing the L3C ecosystem surveys). Nothing about an L3C affects personal legal obligations: it confers no sovereignty, no tax immunity, and no exemption from state law. Forming one does not separate a natural person from statutes.

3. CORRECTIONS — specific statements that are legally wrong

Each item: doc claim → correct rule + citation.

1. "The U.S. Secretary of State is the 'Archivist' of legal titles of 'The People' ... Beneficiaries of the Estate Trust" (DISCLAIMER l.9). No such office or trust exists. The Archivist of the United States heads the National Archives and Records Administration (44 U.S.C. § 2102) and holds government records, not titles on behalf of citizens. Individuals are not beneficiaries of any federal "Estate Trust." Listed sovereign-citizen mythology (FBI LEB 2011; dismissed as frivolous in *Marcantel* (M.D. La. 2023)).

2. "I am a Foreign Sovereign ... owed The Law of Peace, pursuant to Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-1, from all Territorial and Municipal Officers" (l.13). DA Pam 27-161-1, *International Law, Vol. I: The Law of Peace* (1979), is an internal DoD treatise on the law-of-peace aspects of military foreign affairs; it grants no status, immunity, or right to civilians, and no court has ever recognized such a claim. U.S. persons remain fully subject to federal and state law (Fourteenth Amendment; *Afroyim v. Rusk*, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), on the indissolubility of citizenship absent voluntary renunciation under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)).

3. "...damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2333, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1342" (l.15). § 2333(b) provides a civil action only for U.S. nationals injured by international terrorism (and 2018's § 2333(d) targets financiers of terrorism); §§ 1341–1342 criminalize mail fraud and postal obstruction — none creates a tax-refund or "trespass" damages action. Correct vehicle for a takings claim against the U.S.: the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, in the Court of Federal Claims.

4. "...sue the United States ... a course of action which will never provide remedy because the United States is bankrupt" (l.49). False. The U.S. is not bankrupt and pays judgments: Court of Federal Claims judgments are paid from the Judgment Fund (31 U.S.C. § 1304). The "US is bankrupt/1933" theory is uniformly rejected (e.g., sovCit-dismissal case law collected in *Marcantel*).

5. "In the United States, a 'person' is defined as a 'foreign state' and owner of a vessel, and an 'individual' is defined as an artificial 'federally chartered entity'" (l.51). Inverted and fabricated. 1 U.S.C. § 1: "person" and "whoever" "include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." No federal statute defines "individual" as a corporation.

6. "National banking associations do not have regulatory authority to file liens in the several U.S. States; as is also the case for the Internal Revenue Service" (l.59). The IRS files notices of federal tax lien in state recording offices as a matter of routine law: 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (lien arises), § 6323 (perfection by filing), § 6323(f) (place of filing — state or federal). Banking regulators have independent lien/supervisory powers (12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)).

7. "IRS ... delinquent taxes ... are counterfeiting securities of the United States" (l.61). False, and self-defeating: counterfeiting "securities of the United States" is itself a crime (18 U.S.C. § 471 et seq.); IRS assessments, liens, and levies are lawful exercises of Subtitle F, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6201, 6321, 6331.

8. "...Georgia lost an island in the Savannah River to South Carolina in 1990, when South Carolina had used fill from dredging ... Since Georgia knew of this yet did nothing ... the U.S. Supreme Court ... granted this land to South Carolina" (Squatting doc l.151). Wrong in mechanism. *Georgia v. South Carolina*, 497 U.S. 376 (1990) awarded the Barnwell Islands to South Carolina based on South Carolina's long exercise of sovereignty (taxing, policing, prosecuting there) — i.e., Georgia lost, but via prescription/acquiescence doctrine, not because South Carolina dumped fill. The dredge-fill lands (Denwill Plantation, Horseshoe Shoal) were awarded to Georgia because the Corps' works made the change avulsive (avulsion does not move a boundary), over South Carolina's exception. (The Treaty of Beaufort's islands-to-Georgia default was applied to *new* islands per the 1922 *Georgia v. South Carolina*, 259 U.S. 572, construction.)

9. "In 2008 ... the New York State Legislature amended and limited ... adverse possession. Prior to the 2008 amendment, all that was required was a showing that the possession constituted an actual invasion of or infringement upon the owner's rights" (l.127). Directionally right but imprecise: the pre-2008 test was the five *Van Valkenburgh/Belotti* elements, and *Walling v. Przybylo*, 7 N.Y.3d 214 (2006), specifically held knowledge of true ownership no bar. The 2008 chapter 269 amendments added the reasonable-basis "claim of right" (§ 501(3)) and the § 543 per-se-permissive de minimis/maintenance rules, effective July 8, 2008, applying to claims filed on or after that date, with pre-2008-vesting claims governed by prior law.

10. "Approximately eight years after the 2008 amendment, on 30 June 2016, the ... First Department ... determined ... how the First Department would treat claims ... where title had vested prior to 2008 ... if title vested ... before the 2008 amendment, a plaintiff would have lawfully acquired title by satisfying the pre-amendment standard" (l.129). Accurate as to the vesting rule as stated in *Hudson Square Hotel* (1st Dep't 2016), but the exhibit should carry the caveat that the judgment was later entangled in the *Stang LLC v. Hudson Square Hotel*

misconduct litigation (counsel disqualified; conveyance vacated), so it should not be showcased as a clean win.

11. "HYBRID L3C Defined: The default United States corporate structure" (DISCLAIMER l.151) and "Vermont was the first state to pass an L3C statute in April 2008 which effectively allowed for the L3C legal form to operate in every U.S. state" (l.219). Both false. The L3C exists only in the ~12 enacting jurisdictions (plus tribal codes and Puerto Rico); elsewhere it is a foreign (out-of-state) entity that must register to do business — it does not thereby "operate in every U.S. state." The default U.S. business structure is the ordinary LLC (or sole proprietorship for individuals); L3Cs number only in the low thousands nationally.

12. "an L3C cannot seek to accomplish any political or legislative purposes" (l.183, as a statement of Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)). Mis-transcribed: the third regulation prong is that no significant purpose of the investment may be the production of income or appreciation (and, for the charitable-purpose prong, that the purpose cannot be trade/business or political purposes for the *foundation*'s test); the doc's rendering conflates the LLC-purpose clause of state statutes (e.g., Vt. § 3312, Ill. 805 ILCS 180/37-10) with the regulation. Cite § 53.4944-3(b)(1)–(3) for the actual test.

13. Header framing: "Treason ... Requires aid to a declared enemy nation ... Death or minimum 5 years" (DISCLAIMER l.5). The penalty line is right (18 U.S.C. § 2381), but "aid to a declared enemy nation" is too narrow/loose: the Constitution requires aid and comfort to "Enemies" — courts read this as parties with whom the U.S. is in declared or open war (not necessarily a nation; cf. *Kawakita*). Also omitted: the two-witness/same-overt-act rule (art. III, § 3, cl. 1), which is the operative constraint and the reason the doc's implied linkage — "forming an L3C might expose me to treason" — is fantastical (§ 3.14).

14. Implicit thesis of the disclaimer doc — that declaring oneself a "Foreign Sovereign" and forming an L3C/tradename structure could implicate "Seditious Conspiracy & Treason via L3C formation," or conversely shield one from it. Neither. Seditious conspiracy requires an agreement by two or more persons to use force against the U.S. government (18 U.S.C. § 2384); treason requires levying war or aiding enemies proved by two witnesses to the same overt act (art. III, § 3). Paper filings, sovCit notices, and entity formation constitute neither; they merely waste court resources and, if pursued as liens/filings to obstruct, can themselves trigger prosecution under different statutes (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1521 — false liens against federal officers; § 875 — threats).

4. WHAT'S WORTH KEEPING — accurate passages worth preserving

Squatting or Adverse possession.md:

— l.45–53 — general doctrine: ejectment, statutes of limitations, the five common-law elements, chattel adverse possession (works of art) — clean textbook summary.

— l.63–69 — English lineage: Limitation Act 1623, real-action cutoffs, *nullum tempus occurrit regi* and government-land immunity — historically accurate and useful context.

— l.73–103 — England & Wales modern law: LRA 2002 sch. 6 procedure (10-year application, notice, counter-notice, two-year rule), *Pye v Graham* margin-of-appreciation holding, *Best v Chief Land Registrar* (criminal squatting ≠ bar to title) — accurate comparative law.

— l.109–123 — US disseisor requirements + additional elements (color of title, claim of right, Maine Doctrine, taxes) — accurate general US law.

— l.127–133 — the 2008 NY amendments narrative and *Hudson Square Hotel* description (see §3.9–10 caveats) — this is the exhibit's NY-relevant core; worth keeping with corrected citations.

— l.159–163 — "squatter's rights" has no precise legal meaning; the clock-reset example; tacking/privity — the most valuable passage for the exhibit's squatter-coverage section, and exactly what the 2024 § 711 amendment clarified.

— l.175–183 — the four utilitarian justifications (title-curing, defect-curing, productive use, personhood/efficiency) — good scholarship summary.

— l.371–457 — Philippine acquisitive/extinctive prescription — accurate comparative material if the exhibit keeps comparative scope.

DISCLAIMER — Seditious Conspiracy & Treason via L3C formation.md:

— l.3–7 — the § 2384 / art. III § 3 headline block: statute numbers, penalties, "crime is the agreement itself," First Amendment line ("protects criticism, not plans to attack"), evidence types — genuinely accurate and useful.

— l.21–33 — NY public-benefit-corporation law: NY Const. art. X § 5; *City of Rye v. MTA*, 24 N.Y.2d 627 (1969); *Schulz v. State*, 84 N.Y.2d 231 (1994); *Wein v. State*; ABO 2018 figures (47 state / 531 local authorities; $160.4B debt) — accurate and well-sourced.

— l.35–45 — eminent domain primer: Grotius' *dominium eminens*, *Berman*, *Midkiff*, *Kelo*, just compensation/severance-damages mechanics — accurate.

— l.153–167, 187–213, 227–259 — the L3C explainer: definition, Lang origin, PRI mechanics (§ 53.4944-3), PLR costs, funding segments, SEEDR example — keep as the "what an L3C actually is" section (correct the two errors in §3.11–12).

— l.263–287 — L3C pros/cons tables (PLR cost, IRS non-confirmation, "a well-crafted LLC can do the same") — the honest critique that undercuts the doc's own exotic framing.

VERSION 1 variant: the NYC Corporation Counsel / Law Department description (accurate, 1849 charter origin, division list) is the only unique material worth preserving.

5. IMAGES

Downloaded to /app/data/workspaces/fictiv/images/ and recorded in /app/data/workspaces/fictiv/images/manifest.json (new file; appends nothing — none existed):

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homestead-sod-house-1886	homestead-sod-house-1886.jpg	Solomon Butcher photo: Sylvester Rawding family, sod-house homestead, Custer Co., NE (land-occupation/homestead-era visual)	Public domain (Library of Congress)
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us-code-law-book	us-code-law-book.jpg	Printed United States Code volume (Title 18 sits in the US Code; § 2384 is in Title 18)	CC BY-SA 3.0 (Tony Webster)

All four files verified as real JPEGs on disk (magic-byte check) — 3.6 MB / 3.1 MB / 5.7 MB / 1.9 MB. A fifth slot is available if a portrait of a § 2384 defendant is desired, but respectful-exhibit considerations counsel against booking-photo reuse; the four above cover the requested categories (Constitution page, homestead/land photo, courthouse/gavel, US Code volume).